This paper documents strong evidence of intra-industry return reversals. A contrarian strategy of buying loser stocks and selling winner stocks based on relative performance within the industry generates a significant return of 1.5 percent per month. These intra-industry return reversals are different from the unconditional contrarian profits in several ways. The intraindustry reversals are robust to adjustments to market microstructure biases and more pervasive across stocks that differ by market capitalization, liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility. We show that extreme past stock performance that are not relative industry losers and winners do not exhibit short-term reversals, but exhibit significant return momentum. We also find that the intraindustry reversal is independent of the across-industry momentum. A simple zero-investment trading strategy that capitalizes on both the intra-industry reversals and across-industry momentum produces a large 2.3 percent return per month. While the intra-industry reversals are less likely to be due to investor overreaction to firm-specific information, our evidence points to differences in liquidity level, and exposure to liquidity shocks as the likely source of the reversals.
I. Introduction
The presence of short-term reversals in stock returns is well documented. Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) show that a contrarian strategy of buying stocks that underperformed the market (losers) and shorting stocks that outperformed the market (winners) yield economically significant returns. For example, Jegadeesh (1990) reports a monthly abnormal return of about 2 percent from buying past month's losers and short-selling past month's winners over the period . The initial assertion that the reversals represent overreaction in stock prices implies that prices do not correctly reflect all past information and poses a serious challenge to the fundamental notion of market efficiency. Although a stream of subsequent papers identify alternate sources of the return reversals, the debate remains unresolved. A better understanding of the economic origins of this anomaly is of profound relevance to practical optimal portfolio investments.
One strand of studies attributes short-term reversals to market-microstructure related frictions such as the bid-ask bounce or imbalances in the market makers' inventory (see Conrad, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991) , Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul (1997) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995a) ). A second strand relies on the finding of Lo and MacKinlay (1990) that a large proportion of short horizon contrarian profits can be attributed to lead-lag relationship in stock returns, where some stocks react to common information with a delay. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995b) and Subrahmanyam (2005) , on the other hand, re-assert that the return reversals stem from significant overreaction of stock prices to firm specific information. More recently, Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) argue that return reversals are related to price pressure emanating from liquidity shocks and is concentrated in stocks with low liquidity levels.
In this paper, we re-examine the monthly return reversal phenomenon using stocks grouped by industries. We consider industry groupings because stocks in the same industry are likely to be exposed to similar changes in the demand and supply for their product and services, macroeconomic, technological and regulatory shocks, and hence, share a common source of fundamental return correlations. If return reversals represent deviations from fundamental values and subsequent convergence, due to either overreaction to firm specific information or price pressure associated with liquidity shocks, then a better matching of firms based on industry membership should strengthen the return reversal. Indeed, consistent with this intuition, we find that intra-industry return reversals are significantly stronger than the unconditional reversals.
Specifically, the intra-industry contrarian strategy of buying losers and selling winners over the past month in our sample of NYSE/AMEX stocks over the period of 1963 to 2006 generates significant profits within every industry. The average raw return of 1.46% per month across all industries is significantly higher than then the return of 1.05% obtained when we do not condition on industry information. As expected, adjusting for exposure to common risk factors in Fama-French (1993) does not affect the profits due to intra-industry reversals. On the other hand, the inclusion of a liquidity risk factor (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) ) reduces the amount of reversals, but leaves significant residual intra-industry contrarian returns. We interpret this finding to indicate that liquidity risk is an important component of short-term reversals.
Grouping stocks based on measures that do not use price-scaled variables such as firm size and book-to-market ratio are less likely to be affected by transaction costs (see Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2001) ). Skipping a week between the formation and holding periods eliminates the unconditional contrarian profits, but not those based on intra-industry reversals. Moreover, unlike the unconditional return reversals, intra-industry reversals are significant even for stocks which have large market capitalization, high liquidity and low idiosyncratic volatility. These findings indicate that while the unconditional monthly return reversals are fragile, intra-industry reversals are robust to these factors.
Additional tests indicate that the return reversals are unlikely to be due to overreaction to firm-specific information. If overreaction to firm-specific information explains return reversals, we should expect to see greater reversals following periods of more firm-specific news, such as earnings announcements and analyst revisions in earnings forecasts. On the contrary, we find significantly lower contrarian returns following the month with greater firm-specific news. These findings are, however, consistent with the general notion that firms underreact, rather than overreact, to firm-specific information in the short-run (see also Engelberg, Gao and Jaganathan (2008) and Gutierrez and Kelly (2008) ).
We also examine if delayed adjustment to industries-wide information is related to the intra-industry return reversal. Hou (2007) documents that industry-wide information diffuses slowly across stocks, causing the lead-lag relation in weekly stock return. In Hong, Torous and Valkanov (2007) , the gradual diffusion of industry-wide information explains why some industry returns predict the stock market return in the following month. Moskowtiz and Grinblatt (1999) argue that industry-based portfolios exhibit strong momentum at the monthly horizon. Consistent with these studies, we find significant momentum in industry returns: industries that outperformed (underperformed) the market portfolio continues to do well (poorly) in the following month. More importantly, we show that the delayed adjustment of stock returns to industry-wide information is a separate effect from the intra-industry return reversals. In fact, a combined strategy of buying loser stocks in a winning industry and selling winner stocks in a losing industry increases the risk-adjusted return to above 2% per month.
Firm specific illiquidity and liquidity shocks, on the other hand, contribute significantly to the monthly intra-industry return reversals. We find that the return reversal is stronger for illiquid stocks within the industry: where illiquidity is proxied by Amihud illiquidity measure, turnover or firm size. The reversal in stock returns following a large change in prices is also stronger for stocks that experience a large liquidity shock, measured by large increase in turnover. Overall, we find that short-term return intra-industry reversals are more likely to be associated with illiquidity and exposure to illiquidity shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology while Section 3 present our main findings on intra-industry return reversals.
Section 4 examines the relation between intra-industry reversals and industry momentum. We explore the sources of return reversals in Section 5 and provide our concluding remarks in Section 6.
Data and Methodology
Our primary data consists of common stocks traded on the NYSE/AMEX stock exchanges. Information on the common stocks which have share codes 10 and 11 are obtained from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) database. To classify stocks into industries, we employ the four-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) scheme.
This classification places each stock into one of the 24 industries. Stocks for which GIC codes are not available are dropped from our analysis. Since the GIC codes are available from 1962 onwards, the time frame for our analyses is from January 1963 to December 2006.
Our return computations are based on the CRSP monthly files. We exclude stocks with a price of below $3 each month to mitigate market microstructure effects associated with low priced stocks. Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the monthly returns for the stocks in our sample in each of the 24 industry groups. The average number of stocks in each industry varies from 11 stocks in the Semiconductor and Semiconductor Equipment to 152 in Materials industry. All the industry portfolio returns exhibit significant positive autocorrelations (ranging from 0.06 to 0.24) while the average individual stock returns autocorrelations within each industry are small and generally negative (ranging between -0.07 and 0.01). These return characteristics are consistent with those reported in the earlier studies (see Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994) , Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and others).
{Insert Table 1 here.} We start our analyses based on returns from zero-investment long-short contrarian strategies. At the end of each month t, we identify the top (winner) and bottom (loser) 20 percent stocks in our sample that experience the highest and the lowest returns, respectively. The contrarian strategy involves buying the loser stocks and selling the winner stocks. The equallyweighted monthly returns from the losers and winners portfolios are then computed for month t+1 to examine the magnitude of reversals. The monthly return from a combined loser minus winner portfolio produces our measure of monthly reversals. Besides reporting the raw monthly returns, we also report the risk-adjusted returns, where raw monthly returns are regressed on several pre-specified common factors. The intercept in the regression model represents our estimate of the risk-adjusted return. We consider three model specifications. First, we use the excess return on the value-weighted CRSP market index over the one-month T-bill return as the sole factor for the CAPM risk adjustments. In the second model, we add the small minus big return premium (SMB) and the high book-to-market minus low book-to-market return premium HML) for the Fama-French risk adjustments.
1 In the final model, we add the liquidity factor introduced in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) as the fourth factor to arrive at the risk-adjusted returns and the data on the level of aggregate liquidity is obtained from CRSP 2 .
To better understand the nature of short-term stock return reversals, the returns to the contrarian strategy are conditioned on industry membership. Specifically, we identify the winner and loser stocks within each industry as the top and bottom 20 percent of the stocks based on their returns in month t. We compute the equal-weighted returns of the loser and winner portfolios within each of the 24 industry groups for month t+1. The zero-investment contrarian strategy, conditional on industry information, involves going long (short) the loser (winner)
portfolio. The conditional contrarian return is represented by the cross-sectional (equallyweighted) average of the within-industry contrarian return and is industry-neutral since an equal amount is invested in the long and short side of the strategy within each industry. 
Contrarian Strategies and Industry Membership

Profitability of Intra-industry Contrarian Strategies
The presence of short-horizon reversals in equity prices is well documented in the literature. Jegadeesh (1990) , for example, reports significant monthly returns from a contrarian strategy that buys (sells) stocks that belong to the bottom (top) decile of stocks ranked by the past one month returns. In Table 2 (Panel A), we report the raw and risk-adjusted monthly returns for the loser, winner, and loser minus winner portfolios for the unconditional strategy.
Consistent with the prior literature, we find significant returns of 1.05 percent to the contrarian strategy based on monthly returns for our extended sample that includes the recent years. The CAPM based risk adjusted returns shows that the loser stocks outperform the market portfolio in the holding period while the winner stocks underperform the market. The returns to the loser minus winner portfolio decline when we adjust for additional risk factors, with the biggest drop 1 We thank Ken French for making available the time-series data for the Fama-French three factor model. These factors are described in Fama and French (1993) . 2 For details on the construction of the liquidity factor, please refer to Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . 3 When we use value-weighted contrarian returns, all the inferences regarding the difference between the profitability of the unconditional and industry-sorted contrarian strategies remain intact, although the average returns are lower.
attributable to the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. This is expected as liquidity effects are an important source of the short term price reversals (see Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), etc) . Nevertheless, we find that the unconditional, risk-adjusted contrarian profits continue to be significant, despite the reduction in magnitude.
{Insert Table 2 here.} Our main focus in this paper is on examining the importance of intra-industry return reversals, beyond those that arise from the unconditional strategy. In Table 2 , Panel B reports the average return to the contrarian strategy applied within each industry. We obtain strikingly higher returns to the intra-industry strategy, even after adjusting for risks. For instance, the raw (risk-adjusted) return on the loser minus winner portfolio based on industry sorted returns is 1.46 percent (0.99 percent) compared to the unconditional returns of 1.05 percent (0.54 percent). As shown in Panel C, the additional return of 0.41 percent month arising from the industry sorting is highly significant and is unaffected by adjustment for common risk factors.
We plot the monthly time series of returns from the loser minus winner portfolio of the unconditional as well as the intra-industry strategy in Figure 1 . These plots show that the profitability of the strategies is not concentrated in any specific time period. Hence, the additional return from the industry sorting mechanism is more likely to be related to crosssectional differences rather than inter-temporal variation in return reversals. In addition, the returns to the intra-industry reversal strategy also appear to be less volatile. Indeed, sample standard deviation of the monthly returns to the unconditional loser-winner portfolio is 4.1 percent, while that of the intra-industry loser minus winner portfolio is only 2.9 percent. Clearly, the intra-industry reversals are more pronounced.
{Insert Figure 1 here.} If intra-industry reversals form an important source of return reversals, we expect to find contrarian profits within most of the industries. We verify this expectation by reporting the contrarian returns in each of the 24 GICS industries in our sample. The results reported in Table   3 provide strong evidence that the return reversals exist in each and every industry. ranging from 52 to 76 percent. Hence, the significant contrarian returns within each industry combined with the low correlation in these returns across industries generates strong reversals, emphasizing the importance of intra-industry reversals.
{Insert Table 3 here.}
The additional contrarian profits in the industry sorted returns may come from two sources: we have identified a better way to pick stocks that are more likely to reverse (stock selection); or our strategy places greater weight on stocks that reverse more (weighting scheme).
Although we apply equal-weights in forming our portfolios, the latter source cannot be ruled out since the number of firms varies across industries. To shed some light on these sources of the intra-industry contrarian profits, we independently sort stocks based on their returns relative to two benchmark groups. We sort stocks based on their past monthly returns relative all other stocks in the market and classify the top and bottom quintile stocks into market winners and market losers respectively. The middle 60 percent of stocks are labeled as market neutral stocks.
In a similar way, we sort stocks based on past monthly returns within each of the 24 industries and classify the stocks into industry winners and industry losers if they are in the top and bottom quintiles. The remaining 60 percent of the stocks are grouped as industry neutral stocks. These two independent sorts into three groups gives us a total of nine portfolios based on the intersection of the sorted stocks. Table 4 reports the results for the nine groups of stocks. As expected, there is a large overlap in the classification of stocks under the two sorting methods -about 80% of the stocks that are classified as market winner, market neutral or market losers are also labeled in the same corresponding groups based on industry sorts. The high degree of overlap between the two strategies raises the possibility that the unconditional (market) sorting produces reversals simply because they are also capturing industry related reversals. To understand the phenomenon better, we direct our focus on the groups of stocks that classified differently under the two strategies.
Here, we find some striking results. Among the industry neutral stocks, stocks which are market losers earn negative market-risk (CAPM) adjusted returns while market winners earn positive returns. The combined loser minus winner portfolio defined based on past performance relative to market returns but are industry neutral, yield a significant negative return of -0.75 percent per month. Adjusting this return for various risk factors only makes the contrarian returns more negative, in the range of -0.8 to -1.06 percent. Hence, we uncover significant momentum, rather than reversals, in the portfolio of loser minus winner stocks which are industry neutral.
Although we place less attention on the stocks which are market winners (losers) but are industry losers (winners) due to the small number of stocks in these categories, we note the sharper contrast (larger negative returns) in these stocks. These findings show that once we control for the intra-industry reversals, market winners and losers exhibit significant return continuation in the monthly frequency.
In contrast, Table 4 reveals that stocks that are identified as industry winners and losers, but are market neutral, exhibit even stronger return reversals. Within the subset of stocks which are classified as market neutral, the raw return from a strategy that buys industry losers and sell industry winners is 1.82 percent per month (t-statistics of 15.34), larger than the 1.46 percent for all stocks reported in Table 2 . Adjusting for common risk factors has a negligible effect on these profits. Hence, the strong intra-industry reversals we document are due to selection of pairs of stocks that are most likely to revert in the short run.
Robustness Checks
Does Microstructure Effects Explain the Profitability of the Industry-Sorted Contrarian
Returns?
Several researchers, including Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) , Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1995a) , have pointed out the short-term return reversals are plagued by microstructure biases such as the bid-ask bounce. To address this possibility, we examine the effect of skipping one week between the portfolio formation month and the one-month holding period. Specifically, we rank stocks based on their returns during the first 25 days of month t and examine the contrarian returns during month t+1. This approach purges the negative autocorrelation in contiguous returns induced by the bid-ask bounce.
In all our robustness tests in this sub-section, we compare the returns to the intra-industry reversals to our benchmark case based on the unconditional reversals. In particular, we focus on the industry sorted contrarian returns in excess of the returns due to the unconditional contrarian strategy. The main advantage of this relative measure is that it provides an indication of the marginal importance of intra-industry reversals in stock prices.
Consistent with the market microstructure explanation, Panel A of Table 5 shows that the abnormal returns from the unconditional strategy become statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, the intra-industry return reversals remain significant, even after adjusting for risk and market microstructure effects. Although there is a reduction in the quantum of returns, the intra-industry contrarian strategy remains significantly larger than the benchmark returns measured by the unconditional strategy. We conclude, therefore, that the intra-industry reversals cannot be explained by microstructure effects.
{Insert Table 5 here.}
January Seasonality
It is well documented that there is a strong return reversal in the month of January and many of these papers argue that this turn-of-the-year effect is due to tax-loss selling (see Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) , George and Hwang (2004) and others). We separately examine the returns to the contrarian strategies in January and the remaining months of February to December. For the January contrarian returns, for example, we identify the winner and loser portfolios based on December returns and examine the returns to the loser minus winner portfolio in the following month of January. Consistent with the presence of a strong January seasonal, Panel B of Table 5 shows that the raw returns from the unconditional and the industry sorted strategy yield large positive returns of close to 4.0 percent in January. However, the unconditional abnormal returns, risk-adjusted for the four risk factors, becomes statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels. Hence, the contrarian return from the industry sorted portfolios survives the adjustment for the same risk factors, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average returns are not different from the corresponding unconditional returns.
More importantly, the magnitude of the industry sorted contrarian return in Panel C for the months of February through December are significantly higher than the benchmark unconditional contrarian returns. To be precise, using industry sorted portfolios increases the contrarian (raw and risk-adjusted) profits by a significant 0.43 percent per month. These findings confirm that our intra-industry reversals are not driven by the well-known January effect.
Robustness to inclusion of NASDAQ Stocks
One of the potential concerns about the intra-industry reversals could be that our results may be affected by a small number of firms in some of the industries. For example, in Table 1 , the average number of firms in technology related industries appears to be low. Consequently, we examine a broader cross-section of stocks by adding all stocks traded on NASDAQ as well.
In Panel D of Table 5 , we report the reversals associated with the unconditional and intraindustry strategies when we include the NASAQ stocks, along with the NYSE and AMEX stocks. The average numbers of stocks in the loser-winner portfolio almost doubles when we add the NASDAQ sample. The average unconditional contrarian returns are only slightly lower for the expanded sample, implying that the general return reversals are similar for the NASDAQ sample. On the other hand, we observe an increase in the returns attributed to the industry-sorted reversal strategy, both in the raw as well as the risk-adjusted returns. Using industry sorted stocks to implement the contrarian strategy generates returns which are about 0.5 percent to 0.6 percent higher than the unconditional strategy. Hence, broadening the cross-section of stocks in our sample strengthens our main assertion that within industry losers and winners are more likely to revert in the short-horizon. 
Robustness across size, liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility
Our findings suggests that the higher profitability of intra-industry return reversal strategies comes from selection of stocks that diverge in value and subsequently converge in prices. To make the results economically meaningful, it is necessary that the intra-industry contrarian strategy does not tilt the portfolio heavily towards stocks that have higher trading frictions and transaction costs. The prior empirical evidence suggests that a large portion of the unconditional short-run reversals may be attributed to stocks that suffer from various market frictions that make it costly for arbitrageurs to profit from the price reversals. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) document that contrarian profits are significantly larger among the smallest stocks, which are likely to be exposed to greatest trading inefficiencies such as delayed reaction to common information. Conrad, Hameed and Niden (1994) show that the reversal in returns are stronger in stocks that also experience an increase in trading volume, reflecting a higher demand for liquidity. In Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) , the contrarian returns are confined to high turnover and illiquid stocks. Pontiff (1996) and Shleifer andVishny (1997) predict that stocks with the largest arbitrage costs have the largest mispricing. Pontiff (1996) argues that arbitrage activity is limited when idiosyncratic risk is high because arbitrageurs cannot effectively hedge their positions.
We investigate the robustness of our findings by applying the contrarian strategy separately within the top and bottom thirty percent of the NYSE/AMEX sample sorted by monthly values of firm characteristics that are related to several proxies for arbitrage costs and market frictions, namely, firm size, liquidity and idiosyncratic volatility. In Panel A of Table 6, we report the return reversals associated with the large and small stocks. At the end of every month, we label the largest (smallest) 30 percent of the stocks in terms of market capitalization as large (small) stocks, respectively. 5 As expected, both conditional and unconditional contrarian strategies yield lower returns for larger stocks. In fact, for large stocks, the unconditional strategy become statistically insignificant when returns are adjusted for risk, based on the four factor model. In contrast, the risk-adjusted monthly return associated with the intra-industry strategy for the large stocks is highly significant at 0.65 percent. We confirm that the intra-industry reversals are pervasive, even among the larger stocks.
Next, we consider if cross-sectional differences in illiquidity among stocks is responsible for the intra-industry reversals. To examine if intra-industry reversals are present in liquid stocks, we compute the reversals separately for stocks ranked on the Amihud (2002) Table 6 shows that illiquid stocks experience greater reversals than the liquid stocks for both the unconditional and intra-industry strategies. Among the liquid stocks, though, the reversals for the intra-industry strategy remains robust and strong, whereas the reversals associated with the unconditional strategy becomes statistically insignificant when we adjust for risks using the four-factor return specifications. It appears, therefore, that even the stocks which generally have a higher level of liquidity experience intra-industry reversals.
The final robustness test we report in Panel C, Table 6 , revolves around investigating reversals for stocks with low and high levels of idiosyncratic volatility. The idiosyncratic volatility is computed as the standard deviation of the residuals from the following two-factor model specification, where the regression is estimated within each month t using daily returns data:
where R jit is the return for stock j in industry i on day d. R Md is the equally-weighted return on day d for the market index, which excludes the returns on stocks that belong to industry i. R id is the equally-weighted return on day d for industry i. The results in Panel C again suggest that intra-industry return reversals occur across both high and low idiosyncratic volatility stocks.
The more pertinent finding is that the intra-industry reversals are always significantly sharper for industry sorted stocks relative to the unconditional reversals. Consistent with the established evidence, the cross-sectional results in Table 6 indicate that a large proportion of the return reversals comes from firms that have bigger exposure to market frictions, and transaction and arbitrage costs. Intra-industry reversal, on the other hand, remains dominant even among larger, more liquid, and lower idiosyncratic volatility stocks, emphasizing that convergence of sharp deviation in prices of firms in the same industry is a more pervasive phenomenon.
Intra-Industry Reversals and Industry Momentum
Our analyses in Table 4 suggest that stock return reversals are primarily an intra-industry phenomenon, and once we account for it, the unconditional reversals documented in the prior literature turn into momentum. The latter results are consistent with several papers that argue for across industry momentum in returns. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) , for example, document significant across-industry momentum, whereby industries that are winners (losers) in month t continue to be winners (losers) in month t+1. 7 Hou (2007) documents that slow diffusion of industry-wide information that could also generate positive autocorrelation in industry returns. In this section, we explicitly control for industry portfolio returns and explore its impact on the intra-industry reversals.
We use a multiple regression framework to examine how the unconditional reversals, the intra-industry reversals, and the across-industry momentum of Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) interact with each other. We estimate the following cross-sectional regression for each month:
where R jit+1 is the return on stock j, which belongs to industry i, in month t+1. We define MLD jt (MWD jt ) as the market-loser dummy (market-winner dummy) variable Specifically, the indicator variable MLD jt (MWD jt ) takes the values of 1 if the return on stock j in month t is in the top (bottom) quintile of all the stocks listed in the market, and zero otherwise. In the presence of the unconditional reversals, we expect the coefficients of these indicator variables, β 1 and β 2 , to be 7 They document that the across-industry momentum goes beyond month t+1, and continues till month t+12. positive and negative, respectively. The difference between the two coefficients, β 1 -β 2 , captures the returns to the unconditional contrarian strategy that a long (short) position in the market winners (losers).. Industry winners and losers are identified in an analogous fashion. The indicator variable ILD jt (IWD jt ) takes the value of 1 if stock j is in the top (bottom) quintile of the stocks in its industry, and zero otherwise. Intra-industry reversals arising from buying the industry losers and shorting the industry winners is depicted by the difference between the two coefficients, γ 1 -γ 2 . Finally, the industry level dummy, ID it , is equal to 1 if the return for industry i is greater than the market return in month t, and zero otherwise. The regression coefficient, δ, represents the returns to stocks that belong to the industry that has outperformed the market portfolio and picks up any positive autocorrelation in industry returns. It is also closely related to the across-industry momentum documented by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) . For robustness, we compute ID it using both equally-weighted and value-weighted industry returns.
The time series average values of the regression coefficients from equation (2) and the corresponding t-statistics are reported in Table 7 . We also report the unconditional contrarian returns, β 1 -β 2 , and the within industry contrarian returns,γ 1 -γ 2 , in Columns (9) and (10) of Table   7 . The estimated coefficients for the regression model A in Table 7 shows that the difference in return between the market losers and winners is 1.05 percent per month (t-statistic = 7.67), confirming the results in Table 2 . Similarly, the regression model B in Table 7 produces intraindustry reversals of 1.53 percent per month, which is close in magnitude to that in Table 2. More interestingly, the regression model C in Table 7 incorporates both the market as well as the industry winner and loser dummies. The estimated coefficients reinforce our earlier conclusion in Table 4 that once we control for intra-industry reversals, the non-industry based winners and losers exhibit return continuations. The magnitude of the return continuation in model C is 0.46 percent per month (t-statistic = 2.79). Once we account for this return continuation, the intra-industry reversals increase to 1.90 percent per month (t-statistic = 17.93).
Regression D and E in Table 7 report the parameter estimates of Equation (2) when we retain all the explanatory variables, and allow us to examine jointly the non-industry return continuations, intra-industry reversals and momentum in industry returns. Regression D employs the variable ID it whereby individual stock returns are equally-weighted to compute industry returns. The results indicate that the coefficient for the industry dummy, ID it , is positive and statistically significant, indicating a strong positive continuation in industry returns. In regression model E, we use the value-weighted industry returns to define ID it . Here, the inclusion of this industry autocorrelations renders the difference in the returns on non-industry winners and losers, β 1 -β 2 , statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results highlight two separate phenomena driving our results: intra-industry reversals and industry level momentum. The difference between these two coefficients, γ 1 -γ 2 , in regression model E, which depict the intraindustry reversals, is significant at 1.5 percent per month (t-statistic = 16.44). In addition, the industry momentum effect generates an additional return of 0.72 percent per month (t-statistic = 8.82). Both these effects are strong and independent.
To gauge the economic significance of the above findings, we devise an investment strategy that combines both the intra-industry reversals and the industry level momentum. Each month, we sort all industries into winners and losers, based on whether they experience abovemarket or below-market returns, respectively. We then examine the returns to winners and losers within the winning and losing industries. For the intra-industry winner stocks in the winning industries, the positive returns due to the industry momentum are negated by negative returns on account of intra-industry reversals. A similar argument applies to the intra-industry losers in the losing industries. In contrast, the loser (winner) stocks in the winning (losing) industries, the intra-industry reversals and industry level momentum are likely to reinforce each other and push the returns in the same direction.
The results reported in Table 8 are very much in line with these expectations. The winner stocks in the winning industries and the loser stocks in the losing industries experience economically and statistically weak abnormal returns. The corresponding four-factor riskadjusted returns are insignificant. In contrast, the abnormal returns are very dramatic for the stocks that are winners in the losing industries, and the losers in the winning industries.
Specifically, the intra-industry loser stocks in the winning industries experience a large return of 2.36 percent in the subsequent month, whereas the winners in the losing industries experience a return of 0.04 percent. The long-short portfolio based on these two sets of stocks yields a huge average return of 2.32 percent per month. Adjusting for common risk factors, does not dampen the returns. For example, the four-factor risk adjusted returns is economically significant at 2.0 percent per month (t-statistics= 14.85). It is also worth noting that this portfolio produces positive returns in about 77 percent of the months. In unreported results, we also examine the returns to the latter strategy in each of the four weeks during the holding period of month t+1.
While the average returns monotonically declines over the four weeks in month t+1, we find significant returns in each of the four weeks. For example, the raw weekly returns for the portfolio of loser in winning industries minus winner in losing industries in weeks 1 to 4 are 1.2, 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2 percent per week respectively. These results reinforce the notion that the predictability in industry sorted returns lasts for several weeks.
Overall, the results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that substantial predictability in monthly return comes from the distinct phenomena of intra-industry reversals and industry momentum.
Intra-Industry Return Reversals: Cross-sectional Evidence
There are two possible explanations for the short-term reversal in stock returns. First, investor overreaction to firm-specific information could explain large returns in the formation month, and the subsequent price corrections in the holding period (Lehmann (1990), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1996) ). If investors overreact to firm specific information which temporarily pushes prices away from their true values, then, the contrarian profits capture the subsequent reversal in prices to fundamental values. However, more recent evidence points to a second explanation based on illiquidity (Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) ). Here, short-term pressure arising from heavy trading drives large deviations in stock prices followed by reversals.
The return from the contrarian strategy represents compensation for liquidity provision. In both cases, sorting within industries helps to enhance the contrarian profits since we have a better matching of stocks in the loser and winner portfolios in terms of their fundamental returns. In this section, we explore the importance of each of these two firm-specific shocks for the observed intra-industry reversals.
Intra-industry reversals and firm-specific news
We hypothesize that if the arrival of firm-specific news is the primary source of the initial overreaction and the subsequent reversal, then we should observe that reversals are greater for the winner and loser stocks which experience greater firm-specific news during the formation month. We use two proxies for the intensity of the arrival of firm-specific fundamental information. Our first proxy is the incidence of the announcement of quarterly earnings. Such announcements not only are themselves informative about firm's future fundamentals, but are usually also accompanied by other news from corporate managers (for example, about dividends and splits) and analysts (about revisions in earnings and recommendations). They are widely accepted as one of the most important sources of information about the firm. We examine whether reversals associated with firms that announce their earnings during the formation month are different from the non-announcing firms.
Our second proxy for the intensity of news is the incidence of forecast revisions by sellside analysts. Since analysts are likely to revise the firm's earnings forecasts if there are new information about the firm's future cash flows, the arrival of firm specific news is more likely for firms for which analysts revise their earnings forecasts than those for which analysts do not revise their forecasts. If the arrival of firm specific news about a firm exacerbates stock return reversals, we should find that greater contrarian returns among firms that experience revisions in consensus earnings forecasts.
To examine the cross-sectional differences in reversals related either to the arrival of news, we modify Equation (2) 
As in equation (2), the variables ILD jt and IWD jt are indicator variables that take on a value of 1 for stock j at month t if the stock is classified as an industry loser or winner, respectively. We introduce an indicator variable DummyX jt , which takes a value of one depending on the value of the firm specific characteristic X for stock j at month t. To examine the effect of firm specific earnings new announcements, we set DummyX jt to one if the firm announces its earnings during month t, and zero otherwise. In equation (3) (3) is the standalone variable DummyX jt , which controls for the direct effect of characteristic X on the future stock return. Similarly, when our proxy for firm specific news is the revision in analysts forecast of earnings, we set DummyX jt to be equal to one if there is a change in the mean earnings forecast for firm j in month t relative to month t-1, and zero otherwise.
We obtain the data on quarterly earnings announcements and consensus forecasts of oneyear ahead earnings for the period 1985 to 2006 from IBES. The dataset is combined with our full sample of firms obtained from CRSP and the merged dataset is used to estimate equation (3).
{Insert Table 9 here.} The results presented in Table 9 for the firms grouped by the intensity of firm-specific information are noticeably different. The return reversals for firms that announce their quarterly earnings during the formation month t, generate reversal of 0.465% per month (t-statistic = 2.87).
In comparison, firms that do not announce their earnings during the formation month t, generate much greater reversals of 1.348% (t-statistic = 8.43%). Similarly, the contrarian returns for the subset of firms for which analysts revise their forecasts during the month t is 1.038%. This is significantly smaller than the return of 1.645% for the stocks which are not associated with any revision in their forecasted earnings in month t. 8 These findings suggest that the arrival of firmspecific news implied by the firm's quarterly earnings announcements or revision in forecasted earnings mitigate the intra-industry reversals rather than exacerbating it. Hence, the arrival of firm specific news dampens the stock return reversals. This is consistent with the extant literature which documents stock price momentum, rather than reversals, associated with a wide array of firm news, such as earnings news, recommendation revisions, repurchases, stock splits, dividend initiation an omission etc. This evidence weakens the case of the overreaction to firm news as the major driver of the intra-industry reversals. 
Intra-Industry Reversals and Illiquidity
If it is not the overreaction to firm news that creates reversals, perhaps it is the firmspecific liquidity shocks that contribute to the reversals. We next explore this explanation for reversals using three firm characteristics that could proxy for illiquidity: Amihud illiquidity measure, turnover, and firm size. Large value of Amihud illiquidity, low turnover and small market capitalization are commonly associated with low levels of liquidity. We examine crosssectional differences in reversals for stocks that vary on these three liquidity characteristics by equating DummyX jt in Equation (3) to one if stock j is more liquid than the median firm in the industry in month t. Unlike the grouping used in Table 6 , illiquidity is now defined relative to other firms in the industry to better capture within industry differences in firm specific illiquidity. We hypothesize that stocks which are more illiquid (and/or experiences greater liquidity shock) are more likely to exhibit return reversals.
The results are reported in Table 9 . The return reversals are significantly stronger for stocks with higher values of Amihud Illiquidity, lower turnover, or smaller market capitalization, within the industry. The difference in the reversals between stocks with high and low Amihud illiquidity is 0.809% per month while the difference between the low and high turnover stocks is even larger at 0.940%. The difference between the reversals of small and large stocks is also significant at 0.519%. We also explore if changes in illiquidity also affect the within industry reversals, where we use the monthly change in turnover as a proxy for liquidity shocks. The results in the last row of Table 9 show that intra-industry reversals are larger for stocks which experience liquidity shocks that is greater than the industry median. Overall, the cumulative evidence suggests that intra-industry reversals are correlated with within industry differences in illiquidity and illiquidity shocks.
To further explore the liquidity-based explanation, we examine the duration of the reversals. Liquidity-driven shocks are expected to be temporary, as liquidity providers absorb the temporary deviations due to shifts in the demand for liquidity. We compute the unconditional and intra-industry contrarian returns for each week (i.e. weeks 1 through 4) during the holding period of month t+1.
The results reported in Table 10 breaks down the month t+1 returns into four weekly returns. Although both the unconditional and the industry sorted return reversals decline rapidly over the holding month, they exhibit different time lags for a complete decay. The unconditional contrarian strategy shows significant returns in weeks 1 and 2 only. On the other hand, the intraindustry reversals continue to be significant for up to 3 weeks. To the extend that our results are driven by illiquidity in stocks, our findings indicate that the within industry liquidity shocks last for up to 3 weeks, although a great proportion of the reversals takes place in the first week.
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Equity markets could be far from perfectly liquid. Early evidence of short-term price pressure comes from studies around S&P index inclusions (e.g., Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) ) 11 and large-block transactions (e.g., Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Scholes (1972) ).
More recently, Coval and Stafford (2007) provide evidence that fund inflows and outflows lead to forced buying and selling by mutual funds and create price pressure in the stocks commonly held by the constrained mutual funds. In many studies of price pressure, the post-event reversal is itself treated as evidence that the earlier price change was due to uninformed, liquidity-driven, shock. As Coval and Stafford (2007) argue, their evidence provides support to a price pressure story, whereby stock prices diverge from their fundamental values because of uninformed shocks to excess demand to compensate those who provide liquidity.
Our results in Table 9 and 10 highlight three aspects of the intra-industry reversals which supports a liquidity-based explanation of these reversals. First, the reversals are greater for stocks for which there is little identifiable earnings-related news. Second, the reversals are greater for stocks with lower levels of liquidity. This is consistent with the slope of the demand curve being steeper for illiquid stocks; so non-informational demand for liquidity impacts such stocks more and creates greater reversals. Third, we confirm that intra-industry reversals represent a temporary phenomenon, and do not extend beyond three weeks. Together, these findings point to an important role of liquidity for the intra-industry reversals. It is also worth noting that the abnormal returns associated with the intra-industry contrarian strategy that we report throughout the paper become significantly reduced when we add Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity levels as a factor in the return regressions. Hence, the contrarian profits we document in this paper shows that short-term reversals are related to both differences in liquidity levels as well as liquidity risks. Widespread prevalence of these reversals, along with a liquidity-based explanation, supports the argument that episodes of illiquidity in equity markets might not be confined to specific events, and could be a more general and recurring phenomenon than hitherto commonly assumed.
VII. Conclusion
This paper documents strong evidence of intra-industry return reversals. We find that a contrarian strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners within industries generates a significant return of 1.5 percent per month. These returns are different from the unconditional contrarian profits reported in the literature in several ways. First, the intra-industry reversals are robust to adjustments to market microstructure biases. For example, we find that the monthly contrarian strategy applied within each industry is robust to skipping a week between formation and holding periods and persist up to three weeks. Second, the reversals within industries are prevalent even among the stocks that belong to the top thirtile of firms on NYSE/MAEX in terms of firm size and liquidity. We also find significant contrarian returns for firms that have relatively lower idiosyncratic volatility. Third, we show that stock that do not belong the portfolio constructed based relative industry losers and winners do not exhibit short-term reversals. In fact, we find that these stocks exhibit significant return momentum. Fourth, we find that the intra-industry reversal in independent of the across-industry momentum reported in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) . We devise a simple zero-investment trading strategy that capitalizes on both the intra-industry reversals and across-industry momentum that produces a large 2.3 percent per month. Finally, we argue that the intra-industry reversals are less likely to be due to investor overreaction to firm-specific information. On the contrary, we find some evidence which points differences in liquidity among the firms in the industry as the likely source of the reversals we report here. 
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Table 2 Returns to Contrarian Investment Strategies
In Panel A, we report the equally-weighted returns in month t+1 for the Loser (Winner) stocks comprising the bottom (top) 20 percent of stocks in the market in terms of returns during month t. The returns to a zero cost, contrarian strategy is obtained as the difference between the returns on the loser and winner portfolios (loserswinners). In Panel B, we report the returns from a similar contrarian strategy applied within each industry. Stocks are first sorted into 24 industry groups based on 4-digit GICS codes. Within each GICS industry group, stocks are ranked into quintiles according to their month t returns to form the Loser and Winner portfolios. After computing the returns on losers and winners portfolios within each industry during month t+1, the industry returns are equallyweighted to obtain the overall returns from the losers and winners portfolios. The returns for the zero-cost, loserswinners portfolio, is similarly computed first within each industry, and then averaged across all industries. The differences between the returns of the unconditional strategy of Panel A and those of the intra-industry strategy are reported in Panel C. We also report the percentage of months when the zero-cost portfolios generate positive returns. The sample period ranges from 1963 to 2006. Raw returns are reported in Column (3). Columns (4) through (6) report risk-adjusted returns using, respectively, CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model, and a 4-factor model which includes the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Table 3 Returns for the Contrarian Strategy within Each Industry
This table reports the characteristic and returns from a zero cost, long-short contrarian strategy applied within each industry. The strategy involves taking long positions in the loser stocks and short positions in the winner stocks, where the loser (winner) stocks are the bottom (top) 20 percent of the stocks in the industry in terms of the returns during the previous month. This losers-winners portfolio is rebalanced at the end of each month. The sample period is from 1963 to 2006. 
Table 4 Two-way independent sorts based on returns relative to market and industry
This table reports the composition and returns during month t+1 of portfolios formed by double-sorting stocks (independently) on their returns during month t. Each stock is ranked based on its returns relative to all other stocks in the market, and also relative to other stocks within its industry. A stock is labeled as Market Loser (Winner) if it falls among the bottom (top) 30% of all the stocks listed in the market in terms of returns during month t. Stocks that are neither winner nor loser are placed in the Market Neutral category. Labeling of stocks as Industry Loser, Industry Neutral, or Industry Winner is analogously done within each 4-digit GICS industry group. Each row reports return on a portfolio as identified in Column (1). The sample period ranges from 1963 to 2006. Raw returns are reported in Column (4). Columns (5) through (7) report risk-adjusted returns using, respectively, CAPM, FamaFrench 3-factor model, and a 4-factor model which includes the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. This table examines the robustness of the returns from various contrarian strategies. Within each Panel, the unconditional (losers-winners) strategy is a zero cost contrarian strategy that takes long position in the stocks that fall in the top quintile of the market in terms of their returns during month t, and short position in the stocks that fall in the bottom quintile. The intra-industry (losers-winners) strategy is also a zero cost contrarian strategy, but it takes long (short) positions in the stocks that fall in the top (bottom) quintile of lagged returns with respect to other stocks in the same industry. The third row in each panel reports the difference in the return of the intra-industry and unconditional strategies. Raw returns during month t+1 from each portfolio are reported in Column (3). Columns (4) through (6) report risk-adjusted returns using, respectively, CAPM, Fama-French 3-factor model, and a 4-factor model which includes the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. We also report the percentage of months when the zero-cost portfolios generate positive returns. Panel A reports the returns from the contrarian strategies during the month of January, whereas Panel B reports similar returns for the remaining months from February to December. In Panel C, we skip a week between the portfolio formation month and the holding period, and rank stocks based on their returns during the first 25 days of month t. In Panel D, we report the returns of the contrarian strategies when we retain the NASDAQ stocks in our sample. This table examines the returns from various contrarian strategies in sub-samples of stocks identified using various stock characteristics. Within each panel, we first identify two sub-samples of stocks that fall in the top and bottom 30% of all stocks with respect to certain stock characteristics, and then report the returns for the contrarian strategies for the two sub-samples. The unconditional (losers-winners) strategy is a zero cost contrarian strategy that takes long position in the stocks that fall in the top quintile of the market in terms of their returns during month t, and short position in the stocks that fall in the bottom quintile. The intraindustry (losers-winners) strategy is also a zero cost contrarian strategy, but it takes long (short) positions in the stocks that fall in the top (bottom) quintile of lagged returns with respect to other stocks in the same industry. The third row in each panel reports the difference in the return of the intra-industry and unconditional strategies. Raw returns, as well as various risk-adjusted returns, during month t+1 are reported for each portfolio. Panel A compares the returns from the contrarian strategies for small versus large stocks. Panel B reports returns on the contrarian strategies for stocks with lowest and highest values of Amihud Illiquidity measure. In Panel C, we separate stocks based on their idiosyncratic volatility. Idiosyncratic volatility is computed as the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model, augmented with industry returns, and estimated using daily stock returns from the formation month. where R jit+1 is the return on stock j, which belongs to industry i, in month t+1. MLD jt and MWD jt are indicator variables that signify market losers and winners, respectively. Specifically, the variable MLD jt (MWD jt ) takes the values of 1 if the return on stock j in month t is in the bottom (top) quintile of all the stocks listed in the market, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the variable ILD jt and IWD jt are indicator variables that signify industry losers and winners, respectively. The indicator variable ILD jt (IWD jt ) takes the value of 1 if stock j is in the bottom (top) quintile of the stocks in the industry, and zero otherwise. The industry level dummy, ID it , is equal to 1 if the return for industry i is greater than the market return in month t, and zero otherwise. We compute this variable, alternately, based on equal weighted returns (Column (7)) and value weighted returns (Column (8)). We report the differences between the regression coefficients, β 1 -β 2 and γ 1 -γ 2 , in Columns (9) and (10) This table reports the returns in month t+1 for the portfolios of losers and winners stocks separately for the winning and losing industries. For each month, each industry is classified as either winning or losing industry depending on whether the equal weighted industry return is, respectively, above or below the market return. In addition, each stock is defined as a winner or loser stock depending on whether its return in month t falls in the top or bottom quintiles, respectively, amongst its industry peers. Raw returns as well as various risk-adjusted returns are reported. For the last two portfolios, we also report the percentage of months when the portfolios generate positive returns. The sample period is from 1963 to 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Portfolio
(1) The indicator variables ILD jt and IWD jt take values of 1 for stocks that are industry losers and winners, respectively. DummyX is an indicator variable, which takes a value of 1 if the value of characteristic X for stock j fulfils certain criterion, and zero otherwise. The two interaction terms in the regression involving DummyX and the variables ILD jt and IWD jt , respectively, allow us to examine the effect of characteristic X on reversals. In the first row, DummyX takes the value of one if stock j has an earnings announcement during month t, and zero otherwise. In the second row, DummyX takes the value of one if stock j experiences a revision in the mean earnings forecast during month t, and zero otherwise. For the last four rows, DummyX takes the value of one if stock j is greater than the industry median for characteristic X during month t, and zero otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Dummy for X
Reversals for stocks with Dummy for X=0 (8) = (3)- (4) Reversals for stocks with Dummy for X=1 (9) = (3)- (4)+ (5)- (6) Difference in Reversals for Stocks with DummyX=0 vs. DummyX=1 (10) = (9)- (8) Incidence In this table, we report the returns from the contrarian strategies in which both the formation period and the holding period are set to four weeks. Weeks are from Thursdays to Wednesdays. We report both the cumulative, as well as the weekly returns, from week w+1 through week w+4, for the holding period. In panel A, we report the returns for the unconditional (losers-winners) strategy, which takes long position in the stocks that fall in the top quintile of the market in terms of their returns during the formation period, and short position in the stocks that fall in the bottom quintile. In Panel B, we report the returns on an industry-sorted (losers-winners) strategy, which takes long (short) position in the stocks that fall in the top (bottom) quintile of returns with respect to other stocks in the same industry. The differences between the returns of the unconditional and industry-sorted strategies are reported in Panel C. Column (3) reports the raw returns, whereas Columns (4) and (5) report the risk-adjusted returns using, respectively, the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models. The sample period ranges from 1964 to 2006. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
